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Abstract 
 
The aim of the paper is to inquire on how and why large liner shipping companies and international 
terminal operators have achieved power over Chinese ports.  
Liner shipping companies and large terminal operators are fighting for control over the extensive web 
of commercial relations that China has set up within a short span of time in Asia, acquiring space in the 
terminals. The increase of throughput in the Chinese ports also underlines the need for the development of 
ports infrastructures, services and high level of management.  
Firstly we describe the network of trade through which China is engaged in commercial relations with 
the rest of the world, and in particular with the other Asian countries. Secondly we underline the 
structural and management peculiarities of most important ports of the three main Chinese zones and the 
presence of large lines companies and terminal operators. Thirdly we outline in short the cooperative 
action shown by the Chinese and by the great liner shipping companies to jointly manage the Chinese 
ports. 
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1. The extensive web of commercial China relations 
 
The intensification of the international division of labour is taking place at a 
worldwide level but also within the three areas of worldwide economic influence, 
namely Asia, Europe, the Americas as a result of multilateral trade agreements (Nafta, 
Mercosud, Afta-Asean, UE etc.1). 
                                                 
∗
 Corresponding author: D. Cazzaniga Francesetti (dcf@di.unipi.it) 
1
 Nafta includes Usa, Canada, Messico; Caricom includes Caribbean islands excepted Cuba; Andean Pact 
includes Bolivia, Colombia, Equador, Peru, Venezuela; Mercosur includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay; UE + Messico; Efta includes Norway, Island, CH, Liechtenstein; UE includes 15 new 
countries; Gulf Cooperation Council includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, South Arabia, Emirates; 
Sacu includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland; Saarc includes India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives; Afta-Asean includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippine, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. We can note that China wants achieve an 
agreement with  Saarc e Afta-Asean to strengthening intra-Asiatic trade. Japan has an agreement only 
with Singapore. Some experts consider that ‘regionalism’ shelves WTO ‘multilateral’ efforts, others that 
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It is thus important to underline that the influence of Chinese development is crucial 
not only for maritime trade with the West, but also within one particular zone of the 
three economic zones that make up the present-day world, namely that of Asia. 
The importance of maritime trade within Asia is confirmed by the numbers in Tab. 1a 
and 1b which show that among countries that trade with China as suppliers /users of raw 
materials, semi-finished products, products and also as final consumers, a prime role is 
played by Asian countries, all of which are strongly linked to maritime services2. 
 
Table 1a: Chinese import 1998-2002 Billion US dollars and var. %. 
Range Country 1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
% total 
2002 
VAR.% 
02/ 01 
 Total 140,4 165,7 225,1 243,6 295,2 100 21,2 
1 Japan 28,3 33,8 41,5 42,8 53,4 18,1 25,0 
2 Taiwan 17,0 19,5 25,5 27,3 38,0 12,8 39,2 
3 Korea  15,0 17,2 23,2 23,4 28,5 9,6 22,2 
4 U.S.A. 16,7 19,5 22,4 26,2 27,2 9,2 3,9 
5 Germany 7,0 8,3 10,4 13,7 16,4 5,5 19,3 
6 Hong Kong 6,7 6,9 9,4 9,4 10,7 3,6 14,0 
7 Malaysia 2,7 3,6 5,5 6.2 9,2 3,1 49,8 
8 Russia 3,6 4,2 5,8 8,0 8,4 2,8 5,6 
9 Singapore 2,7 4,1 5,1 5,1 7,1 2,4 37,5 
10 Australia  4,2 3,6 5,0 5,4 5,8 1,9 7,8 
11 Tailandia 2,4 2,8 4,4 4,7 5,6 1,8 18,8 
12 Italy  2,3 2,7 3,1 3,8 4,3 1,5 14,2 
13 Indonesia 2,5 3,1 4,4 3,9 4,5 1,5 15,8 
14 France  3,2 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,2 1,4 3,6 
15 Canada 2,2 2,3 3,7 4,0 3,6 1,2 -10,0 
16 UK 2,0 3,0 3,6 3,5 3,3 1,1 -5,4 
Source: World Trade Atlas. ICE Pecking Database 
 
In conclusion, the extensive web of commercial relations3 that China has set up within 
a short span of time indicates the complexity of the maritime legs that involve China, 
and justifies the battle between the liner shipping companies in their attempt to acquire 
                                                                                                                                               
‘regionalism’ helps free trade, others that ‘regionalism’ set up chaotic trade agreements. USA try to 
achieve bilateral agreements to deteriorate  the solidarity  of emergent countries.  
2
 Japan is the first supplier of semi finished goods to China, followed by Taiwan, South Korea, and then 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.  
With regard to the export trade, the USA ranks top of the list as China’s main purchaser, but China also 
has a thriving export trade to Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and then Singapore and Taiwan. 
3
 This on the one hand demonstrates the growth of the Chinese liner shipping companies and on the other 
hand it implies that the China is opposing Japanese domination in Asia also at sea. The fact that China is 
becoming the driving force of the Asian economy is closely linked to the positive factors which, together 
with China’s own internal resources in terms of raw materials and its geographic extension, have 
favoured its particular type of growth (liberalization of the economy, favourable attitude towards direct 
foreign investment, high propensity to save and to invest, the link with the US currency, fairly satisfactory 
balance between imports and exports etc.). These factor, apart from the low labour costs, are different 
from those that previously motivated Japanese development or, more recently, the development of the 
Indian economy. The difference is that the Chinese economic growth model is not based essentially on 
exports, because domestic demand within China also plays a major role. 
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space in the terminals. China’s new commercial network calls for increasingly reliable 
infrastructures, qualified management of ports and maritime services. The growth of 
Chinese maritime services out of the worldwide share rose from little more than 5% in 
1983 to roughly 14% in 2003. (Source: FMI, database 2003).  
 
Table 1b: Chinese exports 1998-2002 bill $ - var. %. 
Range  Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % total 
2002 
VAR.
% 
02/01 
 Total  183,8 194,9 249,2 266,9 325,6 100 22,3 
1 U.S.A. 38,0 41,9 52,1 54,3 69,9 21,4 28,9 
2 Hong Kong 38,8 36,9 44,5 46,5 58,4 17,9 25,6 
3 Japan 29,7 32,4 41,7 45,1 48,4 14,8 7,8 
4 Korea  6,3 7,8 11,2 12,5 15,4 4,7 23,8 
5 Germany 7,4 7,8 9,3 9,8 11,3 3,4 16,6 
6  TheNederlands 5,2 5,4 6,7 7,3 9,1 2,7 25,1 
7 UK 4,6 4,9 6,3 5,8 8,1 2,4 18,9 
8 Singapore 3,9 4,5 5,8 5,8 6,9 2,1 20,3 
9 Taiwan 3,9 3,9 5,0 5,0 6,5 1,9 31,7 
10 Italy 2,6 2,9 3,8 4,0 4,8 1,4 20,9 
Source: World Trade Atlas ICE Pecking Database 
 
 
 
2. Consequences of the great increase in containers in Chinese ports 
 
By virtue of its ports China has now reached a world-class position for container 
traffic. All the ports are experiencing a great increase in container movement. As a 
consequence all the ports are aiming at developing not only their own infrastructures but 
also the necessary management of the ports.  
Shanghai has become the third world port for container throughput and Shenzhen the 
fourth in a tremendous upsurge. See tab. n. 2. 
 
Table 2: Rank of the world ports (TEU 2003). 
1-Hong Kong  20.000 +4% 
2-Singapore 18.300 +8% 
3-Shangai  11.280 +31% 
4-Shenzen 10.800 +42% 
5-Busan 10.370 +11% 
6-Kaohsiung 9.000 +6% 
7-LosAngeles 7.020 +7% 
8-Rotterdam 7.005 +7% 
9-Amburgo 6.003 +11% 
10-Anversa 5.450 +14% 
Source: Containerisation International 2004 
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The ports in the following table are the top 10 in China and maintained the same 
ranking in 2003, although the quantity of containers handled once again rose sharply. 
 
Table 3: Top 10 Chinese ports up to December 2001. 
Grade Port Mil TEU % Growth prev. year 
1 Shanghai 6,3304 112.8 
2 Shenzhen 5,0745 127.2 
3 Quingdao 2,6385 124.4 
4 Tianjin 2,0110 117.7 
5 Guangzhou 1,6283 113.8 
6 Xiamen 1,2948 119.4 
7 Ningbo 1,2131 134.5 
8 Dalian 1,2089 119.6 
9 Zhongshan 0,5464 108.0 
10 Fuzhou 0,4176 104.3 
Source: International Economic and Trading Information, 19 January 2002. 
 
 
The construction of ports has been the government’s prime objective in order to 
ensure both the import of raw materials and machinery and, in a further period, the 
export of its own goods in containers. At present, however, the government policy is 
changed: now for ports foreign investments and management are favoured. 
As a consequence Chinese Authorities want to increase their relationships between 
the Chinese ports and the liner shipping companies/terminals operators (particularly 
from Hong Kong). From the point of view of foreign companies, they want to achieve 
not only the control of the throughput of the Chinese containers but also of the large 
web involving the Chinese trade by the means of a cooperative behaviour. 
China may be divided into three large productive zones that are equipped with ports. 
The zone in the north has Dalian, Tianjin (port of Peking) and Quingdao as ports of 
reference. 
The central area has the great port of Shanghai, followed by Ningbo and Xiamen off 
the island of Taiwan, as ports of reference. 
The southern zone relies on the ports of the province of Guangdong, namely the 
traditional port of Canton or Guangzhou and the three ports of Shenzhen. The most 
important port cities of China therefore extend from north to south and all have free 
zone depots (ICE, 2002; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2003). 
China needs to enlarge the ports, to fit in new equipments and to manage them with 
high level of experience. 
 
 
3.The decisive presence of international liner and terminal operators companies in 
Chinese ports. 
 
The port of the city of Dalian in the north is near to North Korea at the tip of the 
Liaotung peninsula, which represents the furthest point of Manchuria (fashion industry 
and components production, raw materials). The Singapore Port Authority (PSA, 
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Singapore) manages 8 berths. The port of Dalian is the gateway to the regions of the 
north, the traditional centre of China’s raw materials. 
The port of the city of Tianjin in the north is situated on the Yongdinghe River less 
than 50 km from the mouth of the river. It is the port for Peking, about 100 km away 
(import-export of raw materials and products). It is managed by the American company 
CSX World Terminal in joint collaboration with the Port Authority and the Anglo-
Dutch P&O. 
The port of the city of Quingdao in the north, a former German protectorate located 
south of Tianjin, is situated on the Yellow Sea in the north east off South Korea (typical 
products served by the port are: beer, mineral water, metalworking and many other 
products); the Danish company APM Terminals manages 20% of the port’s terminals. 
The forecast for 2004 amounts to 4 million TEU. 
The port of the city of Shanghai in the centre is the largest traditional port of China. 
The port is on the River Yangtse (which has only 8.5m. of draught and so the city is 
reached by barge). The Shanghai Container Terminal SCT, the largest terminal, is 
managed by a joint venture between Shanghai Port Authority and the Hutchison Port 
Holdings of Hong Kong. 
Hutchison is the company with the most shares in Chinese ports4. The port reached 
around 10 million TEU in 2003 (all types of freight). However, post-Panamax ships, i.e. 
ships larger than the Panama Canal, cannot dock at the port of Shanghai. This is a 
severe limitation because all modern container vessels show a marked tendency towards 
gigantisms in order to achieve economies of scale and rapid services by using the hub 
and spokes system. The port therefore needs new terminals and dredging for full-
container ships of 6000/7000 TEU and over. 
The new port will be built to a colossal design on the island of Yangshan in the bay of 
Hangzhou and will be 15 metres deep, with a 30 km bridge joining it to dry land and to 
Shanghai. It will have 52 terminals covering an area of 45 km2; when it is finished, in 
2010, it will be able to receive over 15 million TEU.  
In addition to the Chinese shipping liner companies Cosco and China Shipping, the 
Danish company Maersk of the Moeller Group - the largest worldwide shipping 
company – as well as the Anglo- Dutch P&O ports and the American CSX World 
Terminals will all be involved in financing the new port and managing the terminals. 
The existing port has many services with the Mediterranean.  
The port of the town of Ningbo in the centre is about 150 km south of Shanghai, and 
boasts a container port which showed a strong, roughly 50% growth in 2003 (toys, 
textiles, handicraft, light industry items). It will be capable of receiving 8200 TEU ships 
from the French-Chinese company CMA-CGM as it is 17 m deep.  
Another company worth mentioning is Hutchison Port Holdings which, as noted above, 
has the highest number of investments in Chinese ports and terminals. In fact, at the 
start it held a virtual monopoly on account of its advantageous position in Hong Kong. 
                                                 
4
 Shares of Hutchison Whampoa in Chinese ports: 1-Shanghai Container Terminals (group’s interest 
37%), Shanghai Pudong International Container Terminals- Waigaoqiao phase I (group’s interest 30%). 
2-The Ningbo Beilun International Container Terminals (group’s interest 49%). Moreover: the Hutchison 
Delta Ports (Pearl River Delta Ports in Southern China ) has six joint venture river and coastal ports in 3-
Jiuzhou, 4-Nanhai, 5-Gaolan, 6-Jiangmen (group’s interest 3+4+5+6=50%), 7-Xiamen (group’s interest 
49%) and 8-Shantou (group’s interest 70%). Source: Annual Report 2003 Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 
Operations Review Ports and Related Services. 
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The port of the city of Xiamen in the centre is on an island near the coast and is just 5 
miles off the coast of Taiwan. It is linked to the mainland by a bridge with an airport 
and a fully equipped port (it handles extensive traffic including marble, granite and 
various products). The port is managed by Hutchison Port Holdings. We have to note 
the strong presence of Hong Kong societies in the Chinese ports in the northern zone as 
well in the southern zone of the country. 
The port of the city of Guangzhou (Canton) on the Pearl River in the Guangdong is 
the port nearest to the manufacturing industries of the Pearl River Delta. South of the 
port of Canton is the city of Shenzhen and, still further south, Hong Kong.  
The large liner shipping company Singapore PSA purchased 49% of Guangzhou 
Container Terminals in 2001; the remainder belongs to Guangzhou Harbour Bureau. In 
2002 more than 120 million US dollars were invested in the port for improvements to 
infrastructures and transport, even though draught is still poor at only 11.5m at low tide.   
Owing to the shallow draught the port of Canton cannot really compete with Shenzhen 
and Hong Kong. There are plans for it to be dug out to 13.5 m. (and to maintain that 
depth by combating silting that affects ports on the mouth of a delta) in order to allow 
4000 TEU ships to dock, because it is nearer to inland manufacturing areas, it is a 
cheaper port and inland transport distances are shorter and therefore less costly. But it is 
unlikely that the river could be dug out to more than 13 metres in depth; the port of the 
great district of Canton thus remains convenient only for small-medium tonnage vessels 
that serve intra-Asia and Australia-Asia traffic.  
However, substantial investments are being made in the various terminals and on the 
docks in the port of Canton. In 2003 the port reached around 2 million TEU and aims to 
reach around 4 million in 2005.  
The Guangzhou Container Terminal is the third important project in which PSA is 
investing in China, because it has a strongly developed inter-regional trade with 
Singapore and Japan which is complementary to its business activities. Moreover PSA 
engages in considerable intra-Asian trade from Singapore. 
Shenzhen is the second port city in the Guangdong region on the Pearl River Delta. It is 
nearer to the sea compared to Canton and lies just 20 nautical miles north of Hong Kong 
(around 40 Km).  
Shenzhen has not one port but three: Yantian, Chiwan and Shekou. 
The total growth of containers in the 3 ports of Shenzhen has been considerable, 
reaching 10,800,000 TEU in 2003. Shenzhen holds fourth world position for container 
traffic after the Chinese port of Shanghai, which ranks third after the hub ports of 
Singapore and Hong Kong (see tab. 2&3). Yantian is seeking to become the hub port for 
Guangdong, rivalling the largest hub5 port in the world, that of Hong Kong.  
The other 2 ports remain below one million TEU and for now are mainly feeders for 
Hong Kong or rather complementary to Hong Kong. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Hubs are ports which have seen massive investment in technology designed to cut container handling 
time, and they are endowed with deep draught enabling them to receive increasingly large mother ships 
with which they can obtain greater economies of scale. Hub ports are the reference point for collecting 
container goods from very extensive areas using the hub and spokes system. There is fierce competition 
among the world’s largest liner shipping companies, in a tough battle to eliminate competitors and take 
control of container trade in the area 
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Table 4: Containers handled in the 3 ports of Shenzhen, ‘000TEU. 
year total TEU Shekou SCT Chiwan CCT Yantian YICT 
1994 177,9 87,1 9,1 13,3 
1995 283,6 89,9 31,4 105,7 
1996 589,0 89,9 49,6 353,5 
1997 1,147,3 214,8 150,2 638,4 
1998 1,951,7 463,1 203,3 1038,0 
1999 2,986,5 574,1 350,1 1588,1 
2000 3,993,7 721,0 450,0 2146,0 
2001 5,074,5 753,6 643,7 2752,3 
Source: Shenzhen Port Authority 2002. 
 
Shenzhen, as stated, has three ports: 
The port of Yantian with YICT container terminal already reaches about 15 metres 
draught and will reach 16. The growth of the container terminal of Yantian is 
particularly impressive, rising from 13,000 TEU in 1994 to 2,753,300 in 2001 and over 
4 million TEU in 2003 (Source: Containerisation International). 
Yantian International Container terminal (YICT) is owned to the extent of 50.5% by 
the company which owns the majority of Chinese terminals: Hutchison Port Holdings 
Group (which also owns the HIT terminal of Hong Kong, i.e. the largest terminal of that 
port). It can already receive ships up to 5000 TEU owing to its generous depth of over 
14 metres.  
The Chinese company Cosco and all the large international companies are customers 
of the terminal.  
The port of Chiwan, with the CCT container terminal, which is the most important, 
has a draught of about 14.5 m. It is situated west of Shenzhen, and is managed by 
Modern Terminals Limited of Hong Kong, a terminal management company owned by 
the important China Merchant Holdings of Hong Kong. The latter company has 
investments in all sectors of Chinese ports and land logistics. The port handled less than 
1 million TEU in 2003.  
The terminal has made an agreement with the barge transport companies of the Delta 
to set up a joint service. Such barges transport containers from large and small company 
scattered through a complex district. The terminal is situated about 7 km. from Dachan 
Bay, where American investment by CSX World Terminals is expected (this company 
is the most recent newcomer in this type of business in China but it already boasts 
substantial achievements). The aim is to build a container terminal because Shekou and 
Chiwan cannot expand any further west in the Pearl Delta due to lack of land. 
The port of Shekou (SCT terminal) handled about 800,000 TEU in 2003. Here too 
digging is under way to achieve a draught of 15m., with plans for a further increase to 
17m in the future6. 
The Anglo-Dutch company P&O manages the terminal as a joint venture with MTL 
(Modern Terminal Ltd owned by China Merchants, Hong Kong) and in co-ownership 
with Swire Pacific and Cosco. The Israeli ZIM is the port’s leading client. 
These two ports, Chiwan and Shekou, remain below one million TEU and for now are 
mainly feeders for Hong Kong or rather complementary to Hong Kong7. 
                                                 
6
 In 2003 a further 700m of dock was built for a container terminal, which will be followed by another 
two; in the future there will be 22 dock cranes.  
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4. Co-operation and Chinese ports. 
 
All the largest international maritime operators and liner shipping companies take 
part both in the management and in plans for expansion of all the ports and terminals 
that handle Chinese containers. We have examined their impressive presence in all main 
Chinese ports. They are engaged in a complex policy the winner of which will be 
victorious in terms of influence on Chinese ports (and in terms of profit from the strong 
throughput of containers). 
For the time being the companies are following a flexible policy whereby, on the one 
hand, they act as the best, traditional suppliers of maritime services and complementary 
services while, on the other hand, they are expanding their direct control over all 
Chinese ports in a policy of expansion that includes investments in infrastructures 
offered. Chinese authorities and foreign companies are both keen to strengthen the 
collaboration in terms of planning and developing the container terminals. This coalition 
is definitely helpful in getting the best out of combining commercial expertise of foreign 
societies with the huge market and resources of China, to the benefit of both sides. 
At present, the Chinese government does not believe that the direct Chinese 
‘management’ of the terminals is of strategic importance, since analysts have assured 
double figure annual growth of containers for all the ports. 
Liner shipping companies, foreign operators and operators from Hong Kong8 are 
investing enormous sums of money in rebuilding and deepening the Chinese ports in 
preparation for the arrival of increasingly large vessels. In addition they manage the 
ports as a joint venture with full approval and collaboration of the port Authorities and 
local Authorities . 
This is significant because it shows the flexibility of the Chinese approach, which 
awards priority to efficiency and the ability to attract trade, an ability already confirmed 
by the experience of foreign companies which manage the ports in joint ventures (Yuan 
Lu, ed. Child J., 1995). This approach is clearly cooperative. A cooperative strategy is 
the attempt by organisations to realise their objectives via cooperation with other 
organisations, rather than in competition with them. The cooperative strategy puts its 
focus on the benefits which can be obtained through cooperation and on how to manage 
the cooperation in order to achieve them. The Chinese authorities have chosen a soft 
strategy which offers significant advantages for Chinese ports which are lacking in 
experience, particular competencies or resources. The cooperation may offer easier 
                                                                                                                                               
7
 The two smaller ports of Shekou and Chiwan compete with one another as well as with the large port of 
Yantian and with Hong Kong. In contrast, the three ports of Shenzhen are not in competition with Canton 
(Guangzhou), as the latter can receive only small or medium sized vessels because of the shallow 
draughts and problems of silting up.   
Together, the Delta ports form a network that offers a diversified range with regard to depth, amount of 
equipment and number of berths. In the Delta ports one finds a clear distinction between full container 
inter-oceanic high tonnage traffic that requires deep ports of over 14-15 metres in depth, with huge dock 
aprons, versus small-medium sized ships dealing with intra-Asian and Asian-Australian traffic. Each port 
has its own specific characteristics, even if all of them are aiming to achieve greater depth in order to 
receive larger vessels. 
8
 All the infra-structural investments in Guangdong take into account the proximity of Hong Kong. 
Although Hong Kong is more expensive, it provides high level of general offer, insurance and banking 
services etc. that are still only scantily available in Guangdong and are often run by Hong Kong 
companies. 
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access to new technologies (in favour of China), to new markets (in favour of foreign 
companies), and opportunities for mutual synergy and learning. 
China is the magnet for international port investors in what promises to be a very 
tough battle, in particular if one bears in mind, that as from the end of 2004 they are 
allowed to become a majority share-holder in the terminals. Foreign companies were in 
effect previously restricted to holding a less than 50% share of a mainland terminal 
structure, but the Chinese government (which obviously retains the ‘state ownership’ of 
port land) has gradually taken measures to alleviate this rule in the run-up to the 
generalised opening set for 2005.  
This more lenient approach is motivated by the advantage of having experienced, 
foreign companies both as investors and as management and also to attract ships and 
containers. However, the maritime shipping companies and international terminal 
operators state that despite the ‘liberality’ in the management of investors, duties on 
freight severely restrict final profits.  
The government therefore on the one hand encourages foreign investors and joint 
management and on the other exploits them. But investors in container terminals 
nevertheless believe that it is to their advantage to move into hub and feeder ports in 
China, where growth in production and of import/export containers is undergoing a 
strong increase9 and opens up the prospect of long and remunerative contracts (through 
which the companies will recoup their investments and will increase their market 
power), by providing services and cooperation for the great international manufacturing 
producers in China.  
Given China growth in manufacturing and its high export rate, various foreign 
terminal managers already established in the hub port of Hong Kong have invested 
heavily in the Chinese ports and in three (prevalently feeder) ports of Shenzhen. This 
demonstrates that they intend to build up a favourable context for establishing activities 
in the area, whatever the future brings. 
Meanwhile the supply of infrastructures and services sees Hong Kong companies ever 
more active in China and Guangdong10. The companies also if Hong Kong is the 
leading world port, cannot ignore the growth of Chinese ports in general and the three of 
Shenzhen in particular. As a consequence they offer the greatest cooperation to Chinese 
ports and in particular to Guangdong ports. Shenzhen, is situated just 20 nautical miles 
                                                 
9
 According to Ocean Shipping Consultants (2003), under the hypothesis of a scenario of normal growth, 
world container demand, which stood at 266 million TEU in 2002, will undergo a growth of around 74 % 
in 2010, with a further increase of 25% in 2015. A considerable proportion of this trade concerns China. 
For China the official growth rate published by UN ESCAP (Socio-Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific), predicts an increase in volume of handling in the ports of the Far East and of South East Asia 
— taking 1999 data as reference — equivalent to 62% by 2006 and a further 40% by 2011.    
10
 One of the characteristics of Hong Kong companies is therefore that of delocalizing manufacturing 
industries to China, where land and labour is cheaper, while keeping a tight control over the entire 
production supply chain included transports and the management of the ports. Head offices and the 
commercial management are maintained in Hong Kong. According to the Bank of China Group Survey, 
Vol. IV No 4, 2000. “Since the major resources of Delta and activities are under Hong Kong’s control, 
Hong Kong has played a leading role in the economic development of the Pearl River Delta and thus has 
obtained huge benefits.” It must be emphasised that in spite of Hong Kong’s union with China in 1997, it 
still remains an independent customs area according to the Basic Law (a kind of small constitution for the 
territory of Hong Kong). 
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from Hong Kong and is up to 60% cheaper than the latter for the handling of containers, 
although time and service are far less reliable11.  
In this perspective, the independence of Hong Kong forms a unique situation for the 
promotion of co-operative interaction particularly with Guangdong. Such an approach 
may be evaluated by using various theoretical tools including game theory, strategic-
management theory and organisation theory (Rumelt et al., 1997). These analytical tools 
can be effective in evaluating the growth of the market strength of liner and terminal 
management companies of both regions.  
For example the largest port of Shenzhen, Yantan, is, as it has already been 
mentioned, managed by Yantian Container Terminal Limited, a joint venture between 
Hutchison Ports Yantian Container Terminal Ltd. and Shenzhen Yantian Port Group 
Company Ltd. in a blend of specialised port expertise on the one hand, and 
management of political-bureaucratic relations on the other12. Another co-operative 
attitude can be seen between Hong Kong Port and Maritime Board and Shenzhen 
Municipal Port Authority, which seeks to develop terminal containers by exploiting the 
expertise of Hong Kong and the resources and market of Shenzhen13.  
But the cooperative attitude can achieve an other goal from the point of view of large 
shipping companies and international operators: to be in good position to control not 
only the throughput of the containers in the Chinese ports but also the extensive web of 
commercial relations that China has set up. The complexity of the maritime legs that 
involve China justifies the effort between the liner shipping and terminal management 
companies in their attempt to acquire space in the terminals in order 1-to participate 
directly at the international market in which China acts as a protagonist and 2- to deepen 
the links with Far East countries where new terminals are building up. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The cooperative strategy can offer significant advantages for organizations that are 
poor in certain types of skills or resources as Chinese ports compared with terminal 
management companies and shipping companies. It concentrates on the benefits that can 
be obtained through careful management of cooperation (Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
Therefore the cooperative enterprises form agreements with subjects that possess skills 
or assets that are complementary to one another. In this manner, cooperation can 
facilitate access to new markets and provides opportunities for mutual synergies or 
exchange of knowledge. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This explains why highly valuable goods or those that require precise delivery times, often for just in 
time production or to meet sales deadlines pre-established by the market, will accept Hong Kong’s high 
prices. 
12
 Child, J. and Faulkner, D. (1998), Strategies of Cooperation : Managing Alliances, Networks 
and Joint Ventures, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
13
 Given the delocalisation of many Hong Kong companies to the Guangdong, it is also worth noting the 
Governor of Hong Kong’s proposal for a free trade area with Macao and the Region of Guangdong, with 
the aim of completely liberalizing trade with the area across the border (Source: Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council) 
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